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Acquirers’ earnings management ahead of stock-for-stock bids 
in ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets 
ABSTRACT 
The accounting literature has found evidence that acquirers in stock-for-stock M&A 
have typically managed earnings upwards ahead of a bid. Other literatures have 
concluded that, when stock prices are high and rising, M&A is higher, more M&A is 
financed with stock, market sentiment and stockholders’ perceptions of information 
appear to change, and in these circumstances new (arbitrage) motivations for M&A 
emerge. This paper revisits earnings management ahead of M&A in the light of these 
findings, comparing experience in ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets. It finds that such earnings 
management is more pronounced in hot markets; that only in such markets are positive 
discretionary accruals commonly associated with positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement of earnings; and that in such markets – against the expectations from 
signalling theory – these positive returns are not reversed on announcement of a stock-
for-stock bid. The results suggest that the economic benefits achieved by engaging in 
earnings management during hot markets are indeed significant: in hot markets, we 
estimate that on average share acquirers engage in working capital accrual management 
equivalent to over a third of the average acquirer’s return on total assets in that year; 
and that this earnings management is associated with increases in market value which 
are statistically and economically significant, enabling the bidder to secure control of 
the target with fewer shares. 
Keywords: earnings management; M&A; market sentiment; abnormal returns 
1. Introduction
The accounting literature has found evidence for several countries that acquirers in
stock-for-stock M&A manage earnings upwards ahead of a bid (Botsari and Meeks, 
2008; Erikson and Wang, 1999; Gong et al., 2008; Higgins, 2013; Louis, 2004). A 
rationale for such behavior is that, if stock markets are only semi-strong efficient, 
inflated earnings may misinform the market, increasing the price of the bidder’s stock 
– the currency of the deal. Income-increasing accrual manipulation in the period
preceding the bid announcement may then achieve a more favorable exchange ratio for 
stock, and so secure the target’s earnings more cheaply. 
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Other literatures have concluded that, when stock prices are high and rising, M&A 
is higher, more M&A is financed with stock, market sentiment and stockholders’ 
perceptions of information appear to change, and in these circumstances new (arbitrage) 
motivations for M&A emerge. 
Amel-Zadeh et al. (2016), Nelson (1959), and Scherer and Ross (1990) have 
charted the successive waves in M&A over the last century, and their positive 
association with fluctuations in stock market prices. Figure 1 illustrates the most recent 
two waves in the UK – the focus of this paper. One takeover wave in the UK market 
peaked during the second quarter of 2000, when the value of announced deals (see 
Figure 1a) in that quarter alone reached the record level of c. £151 billion, while the 
third quarter of 2000 saw a reduction of more than 75% (in the run-up to the former 
period, the FTSE All Share index soared to more than 3200, having increased by more 
than 55% since the beginning of 1997). The next merger wave developed in 2003 and 
reached its peak in terms of the number of announced deals (see Figure 1b) during the 
third quarter of 2007, after which the number of transactions decreased by almost 30%. 
< Figure 1 about here > 
Nelson’s (1959) study found that stock-for-stock finance was heavily used to 
finance deals in merger waves. And, more recently, the acquisition wave which 
developed in the 1990s – the greatest takeover wave in history in terms of both size and 
geographical dispersion1 –  was characterized by the overwhelming use of stock as a 
means of payment (Andrade et al., 2001), and accompanied rising prices. 
Shiller (most recently 2015) has contributed a series of studies on ‘irrational 
exuberance’, showing that the fluctuations in stock market prices are much greater than 





is warranted by the variation in subsequent real dividends which they are expected to 
reflect: investors’ perceptions of information relating to stock price are distorted in ‘hot’ 
markets – stocks are temporarily mis-valued. And Shleifer and Vishny (2003) develop 
their theory of acquisition for these circumstances: in this theory, M&A can be seen as 
a form of arbitrage by rational managers operating in markets which are not strong-
form efficient. Bidders use their own temporarily inflated stock as currency even if the 
target’s stock is – in a ‘hot’ market - also overvalued: “acquisitions are made by 
overvalued acquirers of relatively less overvalued targets” (p.305).  
In these circumstances, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) point also to “a powerful 
incentive for firms to get their equity overvalued, so that they can make acquisitions 
with stock” (p.309). In this case, acquirers do not just exploit arbitrage opportunities: 
they can create additional opportunities via earnings management. 
This paper explores possible interlinkages between over-pricing, earnings 
management, merger and means of payment in different phases of the stock market and 
merger cycles. We analyze experience in periods of rising stock prices and vigorous 
merger activity (1997-2000, 2003-2007) in comparison with periods (2000-2002, 2007-
2010) in which stock prices were lower and M&A activity fell sharply.   
We analyze UK acquirers. The London Stock Exchange represents the world’s 
second largest takeover market. The UK accounts for the large majority of European 
deals (Faccio and Masulis, 2005), while the European market is of similar size to that 
in the US (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). During the period under investigation the 
UK exhibited the most intense acquisition activity world-wide, with UK acquirers 
accounting on average for approximately 16% of the global value of cross-border 
acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2015). Figure 1 charts the waves of London M&A volumes 




The paper’s hypotheses and empirical design differ from those of other studies that 
have analyzed earnings management ahead of M&A for the US market. For example, 
Louis (2004) focuses on providing an explanation for the post-merger 
underperformance anomaly and finds that the reversal of the effects of pre-merger 
earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-run negative performance 
of stock-for-stock acquirers. 
More recently, Gong et al. (2008) study the association between stock-for-stock 
acquirers’ pre-merger abnormal accruals and post-merger announcement lawsuits and 
find that the long-term market underperformance of stock-for-stock acquirers is largely 
limited to litigated acquisitions. In the UK case, institutional arrangements differ from 
those in the US, and in our sample period litigation by target shareholders was rarely, 
if ever, observed. Class/collective actions have only been allowed since 2015, after our 
study period (Ashurst, 2017); and even then, because in the UK investors have to opt 
in to an action, rather than opt out as in the US, fewer investors join an action and such 
litigation is less effective (section 2 discusses our research on alternative recourse for 
disaffected shareholders of target firms). 
Hence, while the aforementioned US studies emphasize the post-merger 
consequences of earning management and/or address issues that may not be as relevant 
for UK acquirers, the current study intends to analyze the incentives for earnings 
management in the first place and the reasons for which market participants can or 
cannot factor and undo the stock price effects of earnings management. 
In particular, the paper addresses three related research questions. First, it tests 
empirically the suggestion from the stock-market-driven-acquisitions literature that 
earnings management is expected to be more pronounced during booming (‘hot’) stock 




market conditions are more intense. We find that earnings management ahead of stock-
for-stock bids is indeed largely associated with phases of high market valuation and 
rates of M&A. 
Second, it responds to the criticisms in Fields et al. (2001) and Walker (2013) that 
the results of prior studies of earnings management ahead of share bids are 
‘unconvincing’, exactly because they do not test whether accrual manipulation had the 
intended impact on the acquirer’s share price. In the present study, we specifically 
address the issue of market reaction around the acquirers’ earnings-release date, and 
how this reaction relates to bidders’ earnings management behavior. 
Therefore, apart from examining the extent to which high stock prices can affect the 
acquirers’ propensity to manage earnings upwards ahead of stock-for-stock M&A, we 
further test a related hypothesis – and find that the ability of market participants to ‘see 
through’ and ‘reverse out’ the effects of earnings management depends on the 
prevailing market conditions. We find evidence that in hot markets positive 
discretionary accruals are associated with positive abnormal returns for stock-for-stock 
acquirers – with share prices being inflated in the period preceding the bid 
announcement. But we do not find this association in phases of low M&A activity. 
The third question follows the literature initiated by Myers and Majluf (1984), 
highlighting the different signalling implications associated with the method of 
payment chosen to perform an acquisition – i.e. a share offer signals to the market that 
the bidding firm believes its own stock to be overvalued. Therefore, if investors can be 
misled by earnings management in the pre-bid period, the question arises whether there 
is any evidence of correction of this prior mispricing at bid announcement, when 
investors might (according to the signalling theory) be alerted to these acquirers’ pre-




conclusion that the market reaction to the announcement of a share bid depends on 
whether the latter takes place during a phase of high or low M&A activity. Inflated 
prices tend not to be corrected in hot markets. 
The paper’s main contribution, then, is to introduce market-wide developments into 
the analysis of earnings management ahead of stock-for-stock M&A. Just as Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003) argue that executives take advantage of temporary over-valuation of 
their stock in a hot market to make acquisitions on favorable terms, so also we find that 
executives in hot markets tend more often to manage earnings upwards in advance of a 
stock-for-stock bid. Such markets tend not to ‘see through’ such earnings management, 
and bidders are, on average, rewarded with a higher share price, reducing the cost of an 
acquisition. 
Indeed, the paper’s findings suggest that share acquirers engaging more 
aggressively in earnings management benefit from a relative increase in market value 
by almost 2.4% on average, enabling them to issue fewer (higher-priced) shares to 
target shareholders to achieve a given cash-equivalent consideration. In turn, other 
things equal, each one percent reduction in new shares issued would add approximately 
0.3 percent to the amalgamation’s EPS, cushioning the post-merger earnings dilution. 
The economic benefits achieved by engaging in earnings management during hot 
markets are further reinforced by the evidence that in such hot markets, the higher share 
price is not typically corrected in response to the signal embodied in a bid 
announcement.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses earnings 
management in the context of the market efficiency theory; Section 3 presents the 




and the research design adopted in the paper; Section 5 presents and discusses the 
empirical findings; while Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Market efficiency, earnings management devices, and their detection 
For the executives of an acquirer the potential benefit of an earnings management 
device is achieved if it fools shareholders; and the potential cost arises if it is detected 
and punished. The benefits can be achieved and the costs avoided if markets are no 
more than semi-strong efficient; if the device is opaque; and if it is compliant with 
corporate law and accounting regulations.  
If stock markets were strong-form efficient in Fama’s (1970) categories – share 
prices reflecting all available information, whether public or inside – then earnings 
management and other creative accounting devices such as off balance sheet financing 
should have no impact on share prices.2 If the markets were semi-strong efficient – 
share prices reflecting all publicly available information (the common view in the 
academic literature (Beaver, 1989)) – and a device was transparent, then investors (or 
their agents) would be able to ‘see through’ and ‘reverse out’ the impact of creative 
accounting on earnings, and share prices would behave as if the earnings management 
had not occurred. For example, the UK airports operator BAA increased the estimated 
lifetime of its terminals from 16 to 50 years and its runways from 23 to 100 years 
(Smith, 1996), thereby reducing the depreciation charge and increasing reported 
earnings. But as Archibald (1972) and Comiskey (1971) long ago reported, the response 
of stock market prices to such adjustments suggests that the market sees through and 
                                           
2 Except insofar as the creative accounting triggered cash flows through contracting – for 
example a bonus to an executive which reduced earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). But 




reverses out such changes.3 These devices are transparent and compliant, but – in a 
semi-strong efficient market – inconsequential for share prices. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are opaque, illegal devices which deceive 
investors, distort share prices, and lead to court convictions. An extreme example built 
around an M&A programme, where earnings management was undetected for two 
decades, is provided by the Japanese company Olympus (see Olympus Corporation, 
2011). Olympus executives had embarked on speculative investments which by 1990 
had accumulated losses of some 100billion yen. At that time these losses were not 
disclosed in the company’s financial statements, because the assets concerned were 
recorded at cost, consistent with the prevailing accounting conventions.  
To avoid disclosure of the latent losses, an elaborate device was created. Off 
balance sheet vehicles were created (in offshore jurisdictions) to buy these eroded 
speculative assets from the company – at cost. So no loss was recognised in the 
company’s books. In due course a device was needed to deal with the latent losses 
embedded in the off balance sheet vehicles, and to repay the banks which had financed 
them. So the vehicles acquired companies at fair value which were then in turn taken 
over by Olympus, at inflated prices. The inflated prices generated surpluses in the off 
balance sheet vehicles which allowed these vehicles to repay the loans with which they 
were financed. 
The over-valuations of the acquisitions were eventually corrected by impairment 
charges against purchased goodwill – charges of 55 billion yen in 2009 alone. To 
summarize then, speculative losses were concealed when they were incurred in the 
1980s, and metamorphosed into impairment charges (resulting in reduced earnings and 
                                           
3 With a qualification if the change in depreciation schedule reflected reliable unexpected new 




share prices) some 20 years later. Executives were variously shamed, fired, and 
convicted of fraud. 
It is likely that the majority of earnings management falls between these poles of 
transparent, legal and ineffective, on the one hand, and opaque, illegal and deceptive, 
on the other. As Griffiths (1986) comments on “creative accounting”, his term for the 
manipulation of accounts by earnings management, off balance sheet accounting, etc.: 
“the hallmark of [effective] creative accounting is that it does not involve fraud”. The 
opportunities for legal and effective earnings management arise particularly in areas 
where insider executives, in daily contact with markets and trading partners, enjoy an 
information advantage over outsiders, even including auditors, and have to exercise 
judgement. Then, if or when the estimates are not confirmed by subsequent outcomes, 
it may not be possible to discriminate between unanticipated external developments 
outside the executives’ control, on the one hand, and intentional bias – deceit – in the 
executives’ estimates, on the other. As Dechow et al. (2011) argue, “the more assets on 
the balance sheet that are subject to changes in assumptions and forecasts, the greater 
the manager’s flexibility to manage short-term earnings” (p.19). 
Working capital accruals, a focus of this paper, offer many opportunities for opaque 
but compliant manipulation of earnings which can be expected to distort share prices in 
a semi-strong efficient market. In relation to receivables, Sherman et al. (2003) give 
several examples of companies using opaque devices which bring forward or front-load 
earnings. In one of these, Coca Cola used a ‘channel stuffing’ device: they persuaded 
local bottler-franchisees to take delivery of  concentrate, ahead of when it was needed, 
achieving the bottlers’ cooperation by paying the storage costs and deferring the 
payment date until the time when the product would normally have been delivered. The 




period. In both cases, a sale has been made to an independent party and the receivable 
is not doubtful; so it would be hard for an auditor to challenge the transaction, or for an 
outsider to recognize the sleight of hand. In the ordinary course of business, such a 
distortion would reverse in a subsequent period. But the illusory earnings increase 
would mislead the market and alter the deal terms if a share for share acquisition was 
completed before the reversal.  
Similar difficulties of verification arise with inventory valuation. Cisco reported an 
inventory write-off of $2.25bn in 2001; but in 2002 generated revenue of $290m from 
the sale of written-off inventory. In this case earnings had been deferred rather than 
brought forward: on one interpretation, a ‘cookie jar’ was created, available to boost 
earnings in a future year. The case illustrates the difficulty of detecting distortion of 
earnings when an asset’s value is hard for outsiders to assess. 
Distortions not evident to the auditors may sometimes be revealed by people with 
inside information. After our study period, one of the acquirers in our sample, Tesco, 
was accused by the UK Groceries Code Adjudicator of understating payables, having 
unilaterally withheld full payment to suppliers (Ram, 2016; Vandevelde and Thomas, 
2016). In this case, Tesco faced no financial penalty as the misconduct predated the 
Adjudicator’s power to impose fines.  
Then a whistle-blower from inside Tesco led to the company being accused by the 
Financial Conduct Authority of improper overstatement of receivables in the form of 
rebates expected from suppliers, thereby inflating profit by 326 million pounds (Felsted 
and Agnew, 2014). Tesco paid 215 million pounds in a fine, and compensation to 
investors who had been misled. However, Tesco used a “Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement (DPA)”, which does not require an admission of wrongdoing. It was also a 




The information asymmetry which limits the ability of auditors to identify earnings 
management also inhibits scrutiny by other outsiders. We outside academic observers 
cannot impute deliberate, deceitful earnings management by a particular individual firm 
in our sample just because the discretionary accruals we have estimated with the usual 
models are abnormal. The accruals might deviate from normal for many reasons other 
than earnings management (e.g. a change in payment terms agreed with suppliers or 
customers, unexpected obsolescence of inventory). Averaging over a substantial 
sample, the statistical approach can identify a tendency, with idiosyncratic deviations 
cancelling out – sufficient for our purpose but not for definite identification of 
individual earnings management. In Schipper’s (1989) words as to why researchers are 
able to observe earnings management while users of the managed earnings cannot: “a 
researcher using large historical data sets might be able to document statistically a 
pattern of behavior consistent with earnings management within the sample, without 
being able to say with confidence whether earnings were managed for any particular 
firm in the sample” (p. 97). 
If allegations of defects in published accounts are made in the UK, they are 
investigated by the regulator, the Financial Reporting Council. Its Conduct Committee 
reviews the accounts, and where defects are found, a report is issued (an “Entity 
Specific Public Announcement”), typically associated with a restatement of the 
accounts agreed by the directors. We reviewed all the 53 Announcements by the 
Conduct Committee for the period of this study and two years after (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2017). None of the acquiring companies in our sample – to whom we have 
imputed earnings management on average – was among those investigated by the FRC 




US context, “there are likely many cases where a misstatement goes undetected or is at 
least not subject to an SEC enforcement action” (p.77). 
Perhaps the richest information on earnings management comes from bankruptcy 
administrators. Bankruptcy brings intense external scrutiny which often uncovers 
egregious earnings management. In the area of M&A, Mulford and Comiskey (2011) 
report that the serial acquirer and subsequent massive bankrupt, WorldCom, created 
business combination reserves that had been “overstated” and “which it could then 
reverse, as needed, to provide a boost to earnings” (p.422). In a comparable UK case, 
Coloroll included in its reorganization provision the equivalent of a full year’s profit 
for the acquirer or 12 years’ profit for the target, sufficient to sustain healthy reported 
earnings when it was actually about to fail.4 In each case the reserve or provision was 
transparent, but only insiders could judge whether the quantum was appropriate.  
The UK Takeover Code rules require the Board of a public company target to take 
independent financial advice on whether the proposed acquisition terms are fair and 
reasonable. We have consulted investment bankers and auditors over whether this 
would involve a review of the acquirer’s historic financial statements to identify past 
earnings management which could distort perceptions of the bid terms. We understand 
that the investment bank advising on a deal will prepare a valuation analysis (using a 
wide range of techniques from public company comparables to DCF). This is largely a 
forward looking analysis which relies on future expectations. The transaction document 
will say that the investment bank adviser “relied on the commercial assessments of the 
Board”. 
One senior M&A specialist from a leading investment bank commented to us:  
                                           
4 See also Schilit and Perler’s (2010) discussion of Symbol Technologies’ creation of reserves 
of some $186m for restructuring in connection with its acquisition of Texlon Corporation: these 
included “fictitious costs that were used to create cookie jar reserves to help inflate earnings in 




“Some accounting adjustments [to historic financials] may be considered, for 
example, if the target has an approach to capitalization/depreciation [different from] 
industry standards. In such a scenario adjustment might be made to the forecasts to 
allow comparisons against peers…historical information is [already] audited and 
therefore any adjustments are to aid comparison not to question the validity of 
reported financials.” [our emphasis and parentheses] 
The detection mechanisms are not, therefore, robust in a semi-strong efficient 
market against earnings management devices which are opaque. And if the devices are 
compliant with corporate law and accounting regulations, managers may well escape 
censure even if the devices are later discovered. Crucially for our analysis, if such 
devices are discovered after an acquisition has been completed on distorted terms, the 
business combination cannot be undone (and a substantial deal creates so much change 
in the acquirer’s accounts that a reversal of previous earnings distortion may be 
untraceable). 
In a stock market and merger boom, when price-earnings ratios are inflated, the 
incentives to manage earnings are higher and key participants are likely to be less 
inclined than normal to try to detect and challenge inflated earnings: they stand to gain 
from the temporary overvaluation of their stake in the merging companies, and 
confirmation bias is to be expected in the scrutiny of deals. The acquirer shareholders 
hope to buy the other company on favourable terms – with inflated currency (their own 
shares); the acquirer executives, who drive the deals, mostly gain from M&A even 
where the deal does not benefit their shareholders (Harford and Li, 2007); the target 
shareholders benefit from a temporary over-valuation of acquirer’s shares received in 
exchange, in addition to the customary premium; the target managers are often offered 




from hefty fees once bids are approved;5 and work related to M&A provides a 
substantial profitable income stream for the audit industry (Massoudi, 2016).  
       
3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.1. Earnings management, stock-for-stock M&A, and ‘hot’ markets 
A number of studies for a range of countries provide evidence that bidders employ 
income-increasing accrual management practices prior to the announcement of stock-
for-stock acquisitions (Botsari and Meeks, 2008; Erikson and Wang, 1999; Gong et al., 
2008; Higgins, 2013; Louis, 2004). The implicit rationale for this behavior is that, if 
markets are only semi-strong efficient in Fama’s (1970) terms, opaque earnings 
management may inflate stock prices, securing a more favorable exchange ratio for the 
stocks swapped in the acquisition. 
The Introduction above points to the substantial historical evidence that mergers 
come in waves, accompanying stock market boom (Nelson, 1959; Scherer and Ross, 
1990), that in such waves stock-for-stock financing is heavily used (Andrade et al., 
2001), and that such waves are characterized by irrational exuberance on the part of 
investors (Shiller, 2015). Shleifer and Vishny (2003) develop their theory of acquisition 
for these circumstances: in this theory, M&A can be seen as a form of arbitrage by 
rational managers operating in markets which are not strong-form efficient. Bidders use 
their own inflated stock as currency even if the target’s stock is – in a ‘hot’ market – 
also overvalued. 
In these circumstances, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) point also to incentives to 
manage their earnings upwards to raise the value of their stock. In this case, acquirers 
                                           
5 See the unflattering discussion of the due diligence of an investment bank in the acquisition 
of ABN AMRO by RBS in Treasury Committee (2012). The advisors received a 9-figure fee. 




do not just exploit arbitrage opportunities: they create additional opportunities via 
earnings management. In a similar vein, Jensen (2005) and Kothari et al. (2008) argue 
that managers of overvalued firms, faced with the prospect of disappointing the capital 
markets when the overvaluation is eventually eliminated (what Jensen defines as the 
‘agency costs of overvalued equity’), have an incentive to resist market correction and 
proactively prolong the overvaluation. Among the actions taken to meet the market’s 
optimistic performance expectations, earnings management and acquisitions paid for 
with stock are expected to feature prominently. In this case too, equity is used by 
managers as cheap currency to make acquisitions and provide the illusion of growth, 
thereby deceiving the market into believing that management is going to create the 
value that the market expects. 
Our first test therefore asks whether upward management of earnings by acquirers 
is more prevalent in ‘hot’ markets. 
3.2. Earnings management and earnings-announcement returns 
For earnings management by share acquirers to influence behavior, it must map into 
positive abnormal market returns in the period preceding the announcement of the deal. 
Fields et al. (2001) and Walker (2013) have criticized the results of prior studies of 
earnings management in the context of share swap acquisitions as being of limited 
economic significance, on the grounds that they do not test whether earnings 
management had the intended impact on the acquirers’ share price.  
The seminal work of Sloan (1996) on the ‘accrual anomaly’ suggests that investors 
‘fixate’ on earnings, and posits that investors underestimate the lower persistence of the 




component is high. In a contemporaneous study, Subramanyam (1996) documents that 
the market, on average, attaches value to the discretionary component of accruals. 
As Walker (2013) notes, a key issue in this literature is whether the accrual 
anomaly can be attributed to earnings management. To the extent that abnormal 
accruals are driven by manipulation, the evidence would suggest that opportunistic and 
value-irrelevant accruals are mispriced by market participants who in this way seem to 
reward firms for engaging in earnings management (Houge and Loughran, 2000; Xie, 
2001). DeFond and Park’s (2001) findings that the market under-anticipates the 
reversing implications of abnormal accruals are also consistent with this notion, i.e. that 
market participants, having limited or no information to adjust away the effect of 
accrual changes, can adjust only partially for suspected earnings management. 
These results suggest that abnormal market returns can be earned by implementing 
a fairly straightforward strategy of earnings management. The accrual anomaly 
therefore highlights an important incentive for managers to engage in earnings 
management, given that the evidence reveals that earnings manipulation can have real 
economic effects – managers can potentially influence stock prices by choosing 
alternative accounting methods (Zach, 2003). 
Basu et al. (2013) provide evidence that the period around the earnings-
announcement days accounts for a larger proportion of the variation in annual returns 
than any other corporate announcement. Similarly, Young (2008), in a share-swap 
acquisition setting, predicts that a large fraction of the acquirers’ long-run pre-bid 
returns is expected to concentrate at the point when earnings information is released to 
the market; while Rangan (1998), in a seasoned equity offering context, reports that 





In light of this prior evidence, our second test asks whether income-increasing 
accrual behavior enables prospective share acquirers to inflate their share price, i.e. 
whether it is positively associated with abnormal stock returns at earnings 
announcement; and whether investors’ reaction to the announced earnings differs 
according to whether this announcement takes place during phases of high or low M&A 
activity. 
3.3. Earnings management and bid-announcement returns 
Previous theoretical studies (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984) examining the 
implications of the means of payment chosen to perform an acquisition have highlighted 
the role of information asymmetries between insiders and outside investors regarding 
the true value of the firm, and show that with asymmetric information, managers with 
superior information about their own firm have an incentive to issue overvalued equity. 
This is because common stock used in M&A performs a ‘contingency pricing effect’ 
(Hansen, 1987) forcing target shareholders to share the risk that the acquirer may have 
overpaid (Martin, 1996). 
If the method of payment is regarded as a reflection of the acquiring managers’ 
views of the stand-alone value of their own company (Draper and Paudyal, 1999), then 
a stock offer may also carry an ‘information effect’ (Suk and Sung, 1997), signalling to 
the market that the bidding firm believes its own stock to be overvalued, or is uncertain 
as to the potential synergies arising from the merger. Under this signalling theory, a 
share bid alerts investors to pre-existing mispricing and therefore causes a share price 
reaction to correct misvaluation. Empirical findings dating back to Travlos (1987) 




The arguments developed in section 3.2 predict that market participants could be 
misled by the accrual distortions employed by share acquirers prior to the 
announcement of a bid. Hence, as an extension to the accrual mispricing and earnings 
management arguments, we finally ask whether the attention drawn to the firms 
involved when a deal announcement takes place helps investors correct prior 
misvaluation or not. 
Therefore, we analyze abnormal returns around the announcement of a takeover 
proposal, in order to examine whether market reaction to the announced bid impounds 
the accrual manipulation and whether this reaction differs according to whether the 
announcement takes place during phases of high or low M&A activity. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
The study analyzes M&A transactions that were announced and completed by UK 
acquirers between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2010. Sample transactions were 
selected on the basis of the following criteria: 
(1) The acquirer is (or was at the time of the acquisition) a UK company listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. 
(2) The acquirer is a non-financial, non-utility company.  
(3) The bidder acquired a majority interest in the target company or ended up holding 
a majority interest as a result of the deal. 
(4) The transaction was completed in the form of a pure share exchange (following 





(5) In order to ensure a material effect of the deal on the acquirer, the total consideration 
value must be at least 5% of the acquiring firm’s market value as at the end of the 
month immediately preceding the deal announcement. 
(6) An announcement date for the deal, distinct from its completion date, could be 
identified. 
(7) Sufficient accounting data were available in order to estimate discretionary accruals 
(the proxy for earnings management); while in order to compute earnings- and bid-
announcement returns, stock market data had to be available for the year preceding 
the announcement of the deal. 
The above selection process resulted in identifying 113 purely share-financed 
deals.6 The size of the final sample is comparable to that of prior studies of earnings 
management in stock-financed acquisitions. For example, Botsari and Meeks (2008), 
Erickson and Wang (1999), and Higgins (2013) analyze 42, 55, and 125 share-swap 
deals in the UK, US, and Japanese takeover market, respectively. As Higgins (2013) 
notes, the advantage of a sample of this size is that statistical significance – if found, is 
not merely due to a large number of observations. 
The sample transactions were drawn from the Thomson Financial Acquisitions 
Monthly magazine and from the Thomson Financial One Banker M&A database, which 
provided the required information regarding the dates, the terms, and other details of 
the deals. Where necessary, these were cross-checked with the Regulatory News Service 
                                           
6  From the initial pool of acquirers, 45 had to be excluded due to lack of data availability for the year 
prior to the offer announcement; eight had fewer than six observations in the corresponding industry 
portfolio (necessary to estimate the earnings management proxy in Equation 1); and four had accrual 
figures in excess of one (Louis, 2004; Kothari et al., 2005). Finally, 13 firms were excluded due to the 
fact that the acquisition year coincided with the first time adoption of IFRS, which could confound the 
results of accrual tests. The median consideration value of all excluded transactions is approximately 10 
million pounds, suggesting that these transactions refer to relatively small deals and that the transactions 
that have been included in the final sample (with median consideration value of approximately 59 million 
pounds) are of greater economic significance and capture the vast majority of the M&A activity in the 




of the London Stock Exchange.  All accounting and market-related data are from 
Datastream/Worldscope.  
As discussed in the hypothesis development section, prior literature highlights 
distinct motives for share and cash offers, and forms different predictions regarding the 
earnings management behavior as well as the short-term market performance of share 
and cash bidders. Therefore, a control group of cash acquirers was also constructed 
according to the following procedure: the cash acquirer belongs to the same industry 
(two-digit SIC code) as the share acquirer; as at the end of the financial year 
immediately preceding the announcement of the deal, the cash acquirer has a market 
value between 50% and 200% of the market value of the share acquirer; out of this pool 
of potential cash control firms, the one with the closest Price-to-Book ratio to the share 
acquirer was selected. This procedure was intended to alleviate the impact of size and 
growth characteristics on earnings management and return estimates, and therefore 
highlight the means of financing an acquisition as the driver of any discrepancies found 
between the two sub-samples. Table 1 provides the related descriptive statistics.    
< Table 1 about here > 
On the basis of the discussion in the Introduction and Figure 1, the sample period 
is divided into two distinct phases: the phase of high M&A activity (ranging from 1997 
to the second quarter of 2000, and from 2003 to the third quarter of 2007) and the phase 
of low M&A activity (ranging from the third quarter of 2000 to 2002, and from the 
fourth quarter of 2007 to 2010). 
 
4.2. Estimating discretionary accruals 
Following prior studies of earnings management in an M&A context (e.g. Botsari 




matched (Kothari et al., 2005) discretionary working capital accruals estimated from 
the cross-sectional modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; following Jones, 1991), 
involving a two-stage estimation process. In the first stage , Equation (1) is estimated 
using all non-acquiring firms with available data in the same industry portfolio (two-
digit SIC code) as the acquirer: 
                             WCA ijt  /A 1−ijt  = α jt  + β jt  (ΔREV ijt /A 1−ijt )   + ε ijt                          (1) 
where: 
WCA ijt = working capital accruals for estimation portfolio j for firm i in event year t 
(computed directly from the cash flow statement (Hribar and Collins, 2002) rather than 
from successive balance sheet changes); ΔREV ijt = change in revenue (total sales) for 
estimation portfolio j for firm i in event year t; A 1−ijt = beginning of period total assets 
for estimation portfolio j for firm i in event year t; ε ijt = error term for estimation 
portfolio j for firm i in event year t; i = 1 ,…,N firm index; j = 1,…,J estimation portfolio 
index; t = 1,…,T year index. 
In the second stage, the industry/event year specific parameter estimates obtained 
from Equation (1) are combined with acquiring firm specific data in Equation (2) to 
produce estimated discretionary working capital  accruals (EDWCA): 
                EDWCAit = WCAit/Ait-1 – [a jt + b jt (ΔREVit/Ait-1 – ΔREC it /Ait-1)]           (2)  
where ΔREC it  is the change in accounts receivable for firm i in event year t 
Finally, ROA-adjusted EDWCA are obtained on the basis of the following 
procedure: for each event year/industry combination, four portfolios are created by 
sorting firms into quartiles of current year’s return on assets; in the performance-




defined as the estimated discretionary accrual obtained from the modified-Jones model 
(Equation 2) minus the median estimated discretionary accrual of the matched 
portfolio.7 
 
4.3. Analyzing earnings-announcement returns 
For each acquirer i and for each day t, the abnormal return itAR  is calculated as: 
                                                   )( ititit RERAR −=                                                       (3) 
where: 
itR  = the actual return of sample company i at day t 
)( itRE  = the expected return of sample company i at day t. Following prior 
research on earnings-related anomalies (Ball and Bartov, 1996; Bernard 
and Thomas, 1990; Dechow et al., 2008; Sloan, 1996 for the US; Hew 
et al., 1996 for the UK), the expected return is a size-adjusted return, 
i.e. in this case, the equally-weighted return for all firms in sample firm 
i’s size-matched decile on day t.8 
The average abnormal return 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����𝑡𝑡 for each day t in the sample is then computed as: 










                                                 (4) 
where N is the number of firms whose abnormal return itAR  is available at day t. 
                                           
7 For the purpose of robustness, a range of estimation approaches and accrual definitions were used to 
derive discretionary accruals. These included: the standard-Jones model; ROA-and-growth-matched 
accruals (Collins et al., 2017); total instead of working capital accruals. The results of these further tests, 
which are available from the authors, highlighted the prevalence of working capital accruals as an 
earnings management instrument (Louis, 2004; Sloan, 1996) as well as the importance of controlling for 
firm performance.  Adjusting accruals for both performance and growth produced results which were, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, very similar to the ones obtained under the ROA-only matching 
procedure. Nonetheless, both the Price-to-Book ratio and the growth in sales revenue are included as 
explanatory variables in all subsequent multivariate regressions. 
8 In untabulated results, when the Market Model (see Equation 8) was used to derive expected returns, 




Finally, the average abnormal return is cumulated over longer intervals during the event 
window to calculate the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return tCAR : 
                                                 =tCAR 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����𝑡𝑡 + 1−tCAR                                                  (5) 
Tests of the tCAR  over multiday intervals surrounding the event date (i.e. the earnings-
release date, as the latter was obtained from the Regulatory News Service of the London 
Stock Exchange) are based on the t-statistic in Brown and Warner (1985, section 3.3). 
As highlighted in the review of the relevant literature, the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals exhibited by acquirers in the pre-bid period varies and crucially 
depends on the method of payment (shares vs. cash) chosen to finance the acquisition. 
As a result, it is reasonable to expect the impact of discretionary accruals on the 
acquirers’ pre-bid earnings-announcement returns to also vary according to the type of 
acquirer considered. Therefore, in multivariate analyses, share and cash acquirers are 
pooled together and their earnings-announcement abnormal returns are regressed on 
both the level of discretionary accruals as well as on the interaction between these 
accruals and the method of payment. 
Furthermore, following prior literature relating to the impact of earnings news on 
firms’ earnings-announcement returns, we also include three measures of current period 
earnings news. The first measure – captured by the variable BEAT in Equation (6a) 
relates to earnings surprises, i.e. the extent to which the firm’s actual earnings deviate 
from its expected earnings. Expected earnings have been proxied by the consensus most 
recent analyst forecast prior to the earnings-announcement date. Therefore, the variable 
BEAT is intended to capture the impact of positive earnings surprises on earnings-
announcement returns, where the difference between actual and expected earnings is 
greater than zero. The second measure – captured by the variable PROFIT, relates to 




by the variable PROFIT_INCR, relates to whether the firm’s earnings have increased 
in the current period. 
The inclusion of these three measures reflects the findings of prior studies which 
show that the market rewards firms which achieve analyst expectations (e.g., Bartov et 
al., 2002) and that firms which report profits (e.g., Hayn, 1995) and earnings increases 
(e.g., Barth et al., 1999) earn a market reward over loss firms and firms with declining 
income. All three measures of earnings news are interacted with discretionary accruals 
in order to test whether there is any evidence of reduced market reward for firms that 
use earnings management to beat analyst expectations, to report profits or profit 
increases. Prior studies have indeed documented that managers use discretionary 
accruals to meet earnings targets (e.g., for the US: Das and Zhang, 2003; Degeorge et 
al., 1999; Payne and Robb, 2000; for the UK: Gore et al., 2007; Peasnell et al., 2000), 
and that analysts either cannot anticipate or are not motivated in their forecasts to 
anticipate entirely firms’ efforts to manipulate earnings (e.g., Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003; Wilson and Wu, 2011). 
We finally include a number of firm-specific controls. 
In light of the above, the following pooled OLS regression is estimated9 for each of the 
two merger-activity phases (high and low M&A activity): 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡x𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
        + 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡x𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡x𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
        + 𝛼𝛼8𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡x𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼9𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡      
        + 𝛼𝛼12𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼13𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡   
        +  ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                                                      (6a) 
                                           
9 In order to take into account time-series and cross-sectional dependence in the residuals (Gow et al., 
2010), in all regression estimations standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by both 




where: 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the three-day size-adjusted abnormal return for acquirer i, cumulated 
from one trading day before to one trading day after the earnings-announcement date; 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡are the estimated discretionary working capital accruals; 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a 
dummy variable set equal to one in the case of share acquirers, and zero in the case of 
cash acquirers; 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a dummy variable set equal to one if the actual EPS figure for 
acquirer i at t exceeds the consensus most recent analyst forecast provided prior to the 
earnings-announcement date by Thomson I/B/E/S database, and zero otherwise; 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a dummy variable set equal to one if acquirer i reports positive earnings at 
t, and zero otherwise; 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a dummy variable set equal to one if acquirer 
i reports an earnings improvement at t over the previous year, and zero otherwise; 
𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the firm’s beta (a proxy for risk), estimated by regressing for a period of up 
to 60 months each sample firm’s returns on market (FT-All Share Index) returns; 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the firm’s cumulative return in the previous 12-month period; 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the natural log of total assets; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the Price-to-Book ratio (a proxy for 
overvaluation); 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the percentage change in sales revenue.                                                           
If market participants can see through the accounting distortions and if they 
penalize firms that achieve analysts’ earnings expectations, profits or profit increases 
through accrual manipulation, then a negative sign for coefficients 1a , 2a , 6a , 7a  and 
8a should be documented. 
We also estimate an alternative specification of Equation (6a), namely Equation 
(6b), whereby the variable BEAT is replaced by the actual magnitude of the earnings 
surprise (EARN_SURP). More specifically, the variable EARN_SURP is defined as the 
difference between the firm’s actual and expected (proxied by the most recent analyst 
consensus forecast) earnings, scaled by the beginning-of-year share price. All other 




𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡x𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
        + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡x𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
        + 𝛼𝛼7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡x𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡x𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼9𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
        + 𝛼𝛼10𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼12𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼13𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
        + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡   +  ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                            (6b) 
 
 4.4. Analyzing bid-announcement returns 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the three-day event window 
surrounding the bid-announcement date (day 0) are calculated according to the 
procedure described in the previous section. The only difference comes about regarding 
the way expected returns )( itRE  have been proxied. More specifically, following 
Brown and Warner (1985), studies analyzing acquirer returns at bid announcement have 
conventionally relied on excess returns estimated using the Market Model or the 
Market-Adjusted Model10 (for example, Antoniou et al., 2008; Aw and Chatterjee, 
2004; Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Travlos, 1987). In the present study, the Market 
Model11 has been applied to obtain the expected returns for each acquirer on the basis 
of the following equation: 
                                      mtiiit RRE βα +=)(                                                    (7) 
where: 
)( itRE  = the expected return of sample company i at day t 
mtR  = the return on the market (FT-All Share) index at day t 
                                           
10 Where instead of using a regression to determine the α and β coefficients, α is set equal to zero and β 
is set equal to one. 
11 In untabulated results, the Market-Adjusted Model was also used to derive expected returns. The results 




ii βα ,  = coefficients estimated using an ordinary least squares regression of 
returns on acquirer i against the returns on the market index. The 
regression assumes an estimation period of 200 trading days (t – 259 
to t – 60) prior to the bid-announcement date (day 0) 
A growing volume of evidence indicates that acquirer returns at bid announcement 
are dependent, apart from the method of payment, on target origin, i.e. domestic vs. 
foreign firm (see for example, Conn et al., 2005; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; 
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005), the acquisition premium (Antoniou et al., 2008), the 
relative size of the target (Aw and Chatterjee, 2004) as well as the industry relatedness 
of target and bidding firm (Maquieira et al., 1998). A number of firm-specific control 
variables are also included in the multivariate analyses. 
In light of the above, the following pooled OLS regression is estimated for each of 
the two merger-activity phases (high and low M&A activity): 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
        + 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸_𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡      
        + 𝛽𝛽10𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡   
        +  ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                                                  (8) 
where: 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the three-day abnormal return (obtained using the Market Model) for 
acquirer i, cumulated from one trading day before to one trading day after the bid-
announcement date; 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡are the estimated discretionary working capital accruals; 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a dummy variable set equal to one in the case of share acquirers, and 
zero in the case of cash acquirers; 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a dummy variable set equal to one if 
the target firm is based in the UK, and zero otherwise; 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the percentage 




the bid announcement (it applies to public targets only); 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the relative size 
of the target firm, measured as the ratio of the total consideration paid for the target 
over the acquirer’s market value; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸_𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is a dummy variable reflecting the industry 
relatedness of target and bidding firm, set equal to one if the acquirer and the target 
belong to the same two-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise; all firm-specific variables 
(BETA, MOMENTUM, SIZE, PTB, SALES_GROWTH) are defined as in Equation (6). 
If the signalling argument holds (i.e. if the announcement of a share bid triggers 
negative abnormal stock returns) and if at bid announcement market participants 
discount the acquirers’ share price on the basis of the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals, then a negative sign for coefficients 2β  and 1β  is expected.  
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Earnings management and merger waves 
Table 2 reports discretionary accrual estimates12 over a five-year period (i.e. for the 
two years preceding the announcement of the deal and for the three years following its 
completion) and disaggregates the earnings management evidence according to the 
phase (high vs. low M&A activity) during which the bid announcement takes place.  
< Table 2 about here > 
The reported results  are consistent with the predictions of the misvaluation theory 
that earnings management is expected to be more pronounced during merger-wave 
phases. Indeed, in the high M&A activity phase, share acquirers engage in working 
capital accrual management of almost 3% of total assets in the year immediately prior 
to the announcement of the bid (Year[0]). In the descriptive statistics presented in Table 
                                           
12 All accrual estimates are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. However, the reported results are not 




1, the average ROA figure for share acquirers in the high M&A activity phase is 7%. 
Therefore, even abnormal accruals of the magnitude of 3% of assets are of economic 
significance, since they represent more than one third of the acquirers’ asset returns. 
The corresponding figure for the low M&A activity phase, albeit positive, is not 
statistically significant. 
By contrast, for the control group of cash-financed deals, there does not seem to be 
any difference in the accrual behavior of acquirers between the two M&A activity 
phases – in both cases discretionary accruals are virtually zero and thereby not 
statistically significant.  
One question that arises with respect to the evidence of earnings management 
during merger-wave phases is whether firms actively instigate overvaluation through 
accrual manipulation or whether firms that are already overvalued have incentives to 
prolong their overvaluation through accrual manipulation in order to avoid 
disappointing the market by not delivering investors’ overoptimistic performance 
expectations (Jensen, 2005). Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) stock-market-driven-
acquisitions theory would be consistent with both arguments.  
However, the fact that share and cash acquirers (by construction) exhibit 
comparable PTB ratios (according to the descriptive statistics in Table 1) but different 
accrual behavior is more consistent with the notion that acquirers paying with stock 
attempt to inflate their share price through earnings management in order to profit from 
misvaluation during hot stock market and merger wave phases by using their inflated 
shares as cheap acquisition currency (the extent to which such a strategy is successful 
will be explored in subsequent tables). In other words, it looks more likely that it is the 
method of payment driving the earnings management evidence rather than a glamour-




In order to further test the robustness of this argument,  Table 2 introduces a 
second control group comprising same-industry non-acquirers. Non-acquirers have 
been matched to share acquirers on the exact measure of overvaluation as at fiscal year-
end immediately preceding the bid announcement, according to the methodology 
proposed by Ang and Cheng (2006). More specifically, the overvaluation of a firm i at 
time t is computed as (PTBit-PTBjt)/PTBit, where PTBit is the Price-to-Book ratio of 
firm i at time t, and PTBjt is the median Price-to-Book ratio of industry j (two-digit 
SIC) to which firm i belongs at t. 
In both phases, discretionary accruals for this latter sub-sample exhibit a pattern 
very similar to the one recorded for cash acquirers. Hence, evidence of income-
increasing accrual reporting by share acquirers but not by similarly overvalued non-
acquirers further reinforces the argument that it is the method of payment driving the 
earnings management incentives; and that the earnings figure of share acquirers 
contains opportunistic, and thereby value-irrelevant components. 
A final point to raise on the basis of Table 2 is that, while the earnings management 
evidence is indeed concentrated in the period immediately preceding the deal 
announcement, discretionary accruals for share acquirers during high M&A activity 
phases continue to remain positive for at least a year following the deal completion. 
Jones (1991), who does not find evidence of reversal of accruals in the year immediately 
following import relief investigations, argues that these results may be due to the fact 
that managers tend to reverse excessive accruals over a period of more than one year or 
that they face other incentives that conflict with the reversal, such as the intention to 
petition for import relief investigation again in the near future (avoid losing credibility 
with investors, or make another share-for-share bid, in the context of the present study) 




Dechow et al. (1996), in their analysis of firms investigated by the SEC for 
allegedly overstating earnings, report that 10% of their sample firms manipulate 
earnings for more than three years. If a firm manages earnings continuously for three 
years, the reversal of the initial manipulated earnings will occur at earliest in the fourth 
year, and the subsequent accrual reversal will easily take up a long horizon (Chan et al., 
2004). 
Therefore, the difference between a high and a low M&A activity phase may not 
lie only in the intensity of accrual manipulation, but also in the ability of acquirers to 
delay the ultimate reversal of these abnormal accruals. 
Summarizing the discussion in the context of Table 2, it seems that while the 
method of payment chosen to finance the acquisition is indeed the main driver of 
earnings management incentives, market condition can still have an impact on the 
reported results across the following two dimensions. First, market condition can affect 
the extent of earnings management by stock acquirers: we tested empirically the 
suggestion from the stock-market-driven-acquisitions literature that earnings 
management is expected to be more pronounced during booming (‘hot’) stock market 
and merger-wave phases, and we indeed found that earnings management ahead of 
stock-for-stock bids is largely associated with phases of high market valuation and rates 
of M&A. Second, market condition can affect whether such an earnings management 
strategy is successful or whether market participants can in fact ‘see through’ and 
‘reverse out’ the effects of the instrument used to inflate earnings. This exact issue is 
empirically addressed in subsequent sections. 
A strand of the literature has analyzed M&A incentives in the context of goodwill 
write-offs. In particular, Gu and Lev (2011) trace goodwill write-offs to the incentives 




predicts both the occurrence and the magnitude of goodwill write-offs – the result of 
often ill-advised, overpaid for and strategically misfit acquisitions. More recently, 
Kravet et al. (2015) analyze misstatements resulting in improved company performance 
and subsequent litigation, and find that “misstatement firms are more likely than control 
firms to announce stock-based acquisitions with subsequent goodwill write-downs”. 
In order to analyze goodwill write-downs in the context of our study, we first 
exclude 14 share-for-share transactions that were accounted for using pooling (merger) 
accounting, and for which no goodwill (the excess of the total consideration value paid 
for the target over the fair value of its net assets) was recognized upon completion of 
the deal. This leaves 99 share-for-share transactions (and their matched cash 
counterparts) that were accounted for under purchase (acquisition) accounting.13 We 
examine whether acquirers impair goodwill in the three years following completion of 
the deal. Given that the availability of the goodwill impairment variable on 
Datastream/Worldscope is scarce, particularly for the earlier years in the sample, we 
follow Kravet et al. (2015) and complement our analysis by considering large (in excess 
of 5%) decreases in the recognized value of goodwill. 
< Table 3 about here > 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the frequency of goodwill impairments according to the 
method of payment and the M&A phase considered. As can be seen, more than half of 
the sample share acquirers (53 out of 99) report goodwill write-downs within three 
                                           
13 In the first part of our sample period, under UK GAAP, goodwill is recognized under 
intangible assets and subsequently amortized (FRS 10) and reviewed for impairment if deemed 
necessary (FRS 11). In the second part of the sample period, under IFRS, goodwill is recognized 
and subject to annual impairment testing (IFRS 3). In both cases, goodwill impairment leads to 
a decrease in the balance sheet value of goodwill and in a corresponding charge against profit. 
Amel-Zadeh et al. (2016) provide a thorough discussion of the various considerations 
associated with the different M&A accounting regimes that have been tried over time in UK, 




years of the deal completion, the vast majority of which (41 out of 53) involve share-
for-share acquisitions announced during high M&A activity phases.  
We then consider the extent to which ex ante (pre-bid) earnings management is 
associated with ex post goodwill write-downs for the various sub-groups of acquirers. 
In particular, adapting the methodology of Kravet et al. (2015) in our study’s 
framework, we apply a multinomial logistic regression analysis and use a 
polychotomous dependent variable, GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_HIGH/ 
GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_LOW/GW_IMPAIR_CASH_HIGH, coded 1 for goodwill 
impairments following share swap acquisitions announced during high M&A activity 
phases (GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_HIGH), coded 2 for goodwill impairments following 
share swap acquisitions announced during low M&A activity phases 
(GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_LOW), coded 3 for goodwill impairments following cash 
acquisitions announced during high M&A activity phases 
(GW_IMPAIR_CASH_HIGH), and 0 otherwise. Controlling for several deal- and firm-
specific characteristics, the regression specification is the following:    
Pr(GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_HIGH/GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_LOW/GW_IMPAIR_CASH_HIGH) 3,1, ++ tti  
= 0γ + itRANKEM _1γ + itDOMESTIC2γ + itPREMIUM3γ + itSIZEREL _4γ + itRELIND _5γ         
  + itBETA6γ + itMOMENTUM7γ + itSIZE8γ + itPTB9γ + itGROWTHSALES _10γ + itε              (9) 
where EM_RANK is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if acquirer i is ranked into an 
aggressive earnings management quartile based on the level of its pre-bid discretionary 
working capital accruals at t, and zero otherwise; all remaining variables are defined as 
in Equation (9). 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of the above estimation. As can be seen, 




column (1), suggesting that pre-bid earnings management is positively associated with 
subsequent goodwill impairments only in the case of share swap acquisitions 
announced during hot markets. In other words, compared to control groups, share 
acquirers in hot markets engage to a greater extent in accrual manipulation prior to the 
announcement of the bid (as evidenced by the results in Table 3) and exhibit a greater 
probability to record goodwill impairments in the three years following the deal 
completion as a result. 
Reflecting the findings of prior studies, the results further suggest that high pre-bid 
acquirer market valuation (MOMENTUM, p <.05) and overpayment (PREMIUM,           
p <.01) associated with share-for-share deals in hot markets also increase the probability 
of subsequent goodwill impairments. The same goes for integration difficulties 
associated with the acquisition of large targets (REL_SIZE, p <.05). 
 
5.2. Earnings management and earnings-announcement returns: do share acquirers 
succeed in inflating their share price? 
Table 4 presents Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the three-day 
event window surrounding the acquirers’ earnings-announcement date. According to 
the evidence in Panel A, share acquirers earn positive and statistically significant 
announcement returns of 1.61% relative to a size-matched portfolio when earnings are 
announced during a high M&A activity phase, but experience negative announcement 
returns of 3.35% in low M&A activity phases. By contrast, cash acquirers benefit from 
positive announcement returns in both M&A activity phases. 
< Table 4 about here > 
For share acquirers in particular, for which a discrepancy in the sign of their 




phases, Panel B further explores the extent to which the aforementioned discrepancy 
could be attributed to differences in the intensity of pre-bid earnings management. More 
specifically, share acquirers are split into conservative and aggressive earnings 
management quartiles according to the level of abnormal accruals in the year 
immediately preceding the announcement of the bid, so that CARs can be disaggregated 
on the basis of both a specific M&A activity phase and the intensity of pre-bid earnings 
management. 
It becomes evident that both the positive returns documented for share acquirers in 
the high M&A activity phase as well as the negative returns documented in the low 
M&A activity phase (Panel A) are driven by those acquirers that engage in earnings 
management more aggressively. Aggressive share acquirers earn 2.07% relative to a 
size-matched portfolio during merger-wave phases, but experience negative returns of 
7.53% in non-wave phases. 
The aforementioned evidence is consistent with the argument that investors’ ability 
to unravel earnings management does depend on the prevailing market conditions. 
During hot stock market and high M&A activity phases, the evidence is consistent with 
market participants being unable to see through the poor earnings quality of aggressive 
share acquirers and unintentionally rewarding them for engaging in earnings 
management. 
By contrast, during cold stock market and low M&A activity phases, when market 
sentiment is pessimistic and mistrustful, share acquirers appear, if anything, to be 
penalized for their aggressive accrual reporting. As a result, in low M&A activity 
phases, earnings management by share acquirers does not seem to have the intended 




The earlier discussion is also reflected in Table 5 which reports the results from 
estimating Equations (6a) and (6b). In particular, the results show that whether 
discretionary accruals are significant in explaining the variation in earnings-
announcement returns depends on the type of acquirer considered. 
< Table 5 about here > 
During the high M&A activity phase, the non-significant coefficient on the accrual 
variable (EDWCA) but the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the 
interaction variable (EDWCAxPAYMENT) suggests exactly this, i.e. that it is for share 
acquirers that discretionary working capital accruals contribute to positive abnormal 
returns at earnings announcement, enabling prospective share acquirers to inflate their 
share price in the period preceding the bid announcement. 
Based on estimations from regression model (a), during high M&A activity phases, 
if discretionary accruals increase by one percentage point relative to assets, share 
acquirers experience a 0.29% higher three-day abnormal announcement return relative 
to cash acquirers. For share acquirers engaging in more aggressive accrual reporting 
(for which discretionary working capital accruals rise to almost 8% of assets), the 
average increase in returns is 2.37% (0.2962*0.08). This is equivalent to a relative 
increase in market value of almost 34 (2.37%*1,434.07) million pounds for the average 
firm. The amount is economically significant given that it represents more than 5% of 
the average deal value. When regression model (b) is considered, the relative increase 
in the three-day abnormal announcement return for aggressive share acquirers is 2.48% 
(0.3102*0.08), corresponding to a relative increase in market value of almost 36 
(2.48%*1,434.07) million pounds. 
Combined with the evidence in Table 2, these results are consistent with the 




opportunities to exploit potential misvaluations, and also may have more powerful 
incentives to become overvalued through earnings management in order to be able to 
perform acquisitions using their mispriced stock as currency; and that they can afford 
to do so, given the general market euphoria, without raising suspicions that the reported 
earnings have actually been managed. 
In regression model (a), the coefficient on BEATxEDWCA is also positive and 
significant (at the 10% level though), suggesting that during hot stock market phases 
the market attaches a premium to firms that beat analysts’ earnings expectations, even 
if these have been achieved through earnings management. Indeed, firms that beat 
analysts’ earnings targets through accrual management earn higher returns than firms 
missing analysts’ expectations (in untabulated results, the coefficient on the linear 
combination of BEAT + BEAT × EDWCA when BEAT =1 is also positive and even more 
significant, p-value = 0.030) suggesting a positive marginal effect of beating earnings 
expectations on earnings-announcement returns, at the mean level of earnings 
management. 
The results are qualitatively similar under regression model (b). Firms that achieve 
positive earnings surprises are rewarded with higher returns (the coefficient on 
EARN_SURP is positive and statistically significant), even if these positive earnings 
surprises have been achieved by engaging in accrual management (the coefficient on 
EARN_SURP × EDWCA is also positive and statistically significant).      In this context, 
it is worth noting that on the one to five recommendation scale provided by I/B/E/S 
(where one represents a ‘strong buy’ and five represents a ‘sell’ recommendation), 
sample share acquirers receive an average recommendation of around two (‘buy’). This 




earnings in opaque ways that even skilled analysts cannot discern, then the market is 
likely to be misled. 
The exact opposite pattern is observed during low M&A activity phases: share 
acquirers engaging in aggressive accrual reporting experience lower earnings-
announcement returns relative to cash acquirers (the coefficient on 
EDWCAxPAYMENT is negative and statistically significant in both regression 
specifications); at the same time, there is evidence that the market significantly reduces 
the reward for firms that beat analysts’ earnings expectations  (achieve positive earnings 
surprises) through earnings management (the coefficients on BEATxEDWCA and 
EARN_SURPxEDWCA are both significantly negative). 
Taken together, the aforementioned evidence suggests that market conditions do 
affect investors’ ability to see through the earnings management device. In hot markets, 
not recognizing that high accruals reported by share acquirers are driven by 
opportunism, market participants appear to be misled in that they inefficiently price 
value-irrelevant discretionary accruals and unintentionally reward these acquirers for 
engaging in earnings management. 
5.3. Earnings management and bid-announcement returns 
Table 6 presents Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the three-day 
event window surrounding the date of the bid announcement. As results in Panel A 
reveal, evidence in support of the signalling hypothesis, i.e. negative abnormal returns 
documented at the announcement of a share bid, exists only when the latter takes place 
during a phase of low M&A activity. By contrast, cash acquirers benefit from positive 
bid-announcement returns in both M&A activity phases. 




Results in Panel B further show that during low M&A activity phases, share 
acquirers experience negative returns regardless of the intensity of their pre-bid 
earnings management. It is worth noting however that the magnitude of the 
underperformance in the case of aggressive share acquirers is more than twice that of 
the conservative share acquirers.   
Reinforcing the arguments raised in the context of the earnings-announcement 
analysis, these further results also indicate that during phases of high market valuations 
and M&A activity, market participants are more likely to be misled by earnings 
management and to not fully recognize the negative signal that the announcement of a 
share bid carries. This is because under such market conditions investors are more likely 
to underestimate the extent of the bidders’ overvaluation (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004) and less likely (given the widespread market ‘exuberance’) to 
attribute this overvaluation to earnings management. 
The regression results presented in Table 7 echo the above analysis. Table 7 reports 
the results from estimating Equation (8). 
< Table 7 about here > 
In high M&A activity phases, neither the coefficient on discretionary accruals 
(EDWCA) nor the coefficient on the method of payment (PAYMENT) exhibit statistical 
significance, suggesting that neither pre-bid earnings management nor the method of 
payment affect the acquirers’ bid-announcement returns. By contrast, in low M&A 
activity phases, the negative and statistically significant coefficients on both the 
aforementioned variables indicate that investors react to the signal that the 
announcement of a share bid carries and appear to penalize acquirers that have engaged 




We briefly describe below the potential economic benefits at stake by estimating 
what acquiring firms would gain in relation to the terms of the transaction, when they 
engage in earnings management but the market fails to see through such behavior – as 
is the case during hot markets and high M&A activity phases. According to the 
regression results in Table 5 and the related discussion in section 5.2, share acquirers 
engaging more aggressively in earnings management benefit from a relative increase in 
market value by almost 2.4% on average.  
Assuming that the total consideration value paid to target shareholders remains the 
same (after all, this is the consideration value that secured the agreement of the target 
on the terms of the deal), a 2.4% increase in the market value (share price) of the 
acquirer would decrease the number of shares that the acquirer would issue towards 
satisfying these terms by an equal percentage. Considering that the new shares issued 
to secure control of the target14 constitute a significant percentage of the acquirers’ 
shares outstanding prior to the bid, the implications of this stock issue for the voting 
power and control of existing acquirer shareholders are far from negligible.  
At the same time, for share acquirers engaging in earnings management during high 
M&A activity phases, the average ratio of the consideration value paid to the target 
over the acquiring firm’s market value (a proxy for the relative size of the deal) is 49%, 
implying that the average deal in the sample increases the size of the acquirer by roughly 
50%. An increased pre-bid market value but unchanged consideration value would 
imply a decrease of the relative deal size, reflecting the reduced acquisition cost that 
these acquirers would bear. In other words, the absence of earnings management would 
                                           
14 The information relating to the actual number of shares issued by each acquirer towards completion of 
the deal was hand-collected by reviewing the acquirers’ annual reports and/or the relevant 




mean that more (lower-priced) shares would have to be offered to achieve a given cash-
equivalent consideration (diluting the stake of existing shareholders in the acquirer). 
Furthermore, as per the descriptive statistics in Table 1, if, on average, the deal is 
some 30 percent of the combined market value [620/(1434 plus 620)], then, other things 
equal, each one percent reduction in new shares issued would add approximately 0.3 
percent to the amalgamation’s EPS. This in turn suggests that the lower acquisition cost 
cushions the post-merger earnings dilution. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The paper explores the inter-relation between pricing, method of payment and 
earnings management incentives in different merger-activity phases. Prior studies have 
investigated the earnings management hypothesis ahead of share-swap acquisitions. 
The results in this paper show that the earnings management evidence for share 
acquirers is mainly driven by periods of high market valuation and M&A activity. 
The fact that cash acquirers with comparable PTB ratios do not exhibit income-
increasing accrual behavior is consistent with the notion that the earnings management 
evidence documented for share acquirers is not simply a glamour-effect manifesting 
into accruals, but rather indicates that, in line with the stock-market-driven-acquisitions 
argument, share acquirers actively seek to inflate their share price through earnings 
management in order to profit from misvaluation during merger wave phases by using 
their inflated shares as cheap acquisition currency. 
The results further show that the extent to which such an earnings management 
strategy is successful depends on the prevailing market conditions. More specifically, 
in high M&A activity phases, the evidence suggests that discretionary accruals indeed 




in the period preceding the bid announcement. By contrast, in low M&A activity 
phases, earnings management by share acquirers does not seem to have the intended 
impact on the share price. 
In other words, apart from testing whether stock prices can affect the intensity of 
earnings management, we further show that the ability of investors to ‘see through’ and 
‘reverse out’ the earnings management device is affected by market conditions. During 
high M&A activity phases, market participants are more likely to be misled, to 
inefficiently price value-irrelevant discretionary accruals and, when earnings are 
announced, to unintentionally reward share acquirers for engaging in earnings 
management. 
The results suggest that the economic benefits achieved by engaging in earnings 
management during hot markets are indeed significant: for those acquirers engaging in 
aggressive accrual management, we estimate that the average increase in market value 
at the average level of such earnings management is almost 2.4% or £34million. Other 
things equal, this will be associated with a corresponding reduction in the number of 
shares required in exchange by target shareholders (each share being worth more); and 
with correspondingly higher subsequent EPS for the acquirer. 
In addition, our results indicate that the market typically attaches a premium to 
firms that beat analysts’ earnings expectations even if these have been achieved through 
earnings management. Then, when stock-for-stock bids are subsequently announced, 
our results suggest that, in hot markets, the price gains achieved through earnings 
management are not reversed in the way signalling theory might predict. 
The findings have important implications for both the earnings management and 
the merger incentives literature. First, they imply that in hot markets share prices can 




acquirer’s executives, it could play a leading role in achieving more favorable exchange 
ratios in the context of share-swap acquisitions. This is consistent with Fama’s semi-
strong informational efficiency, where market participants are not expected to unravel 
opaque accounting adjustments which have not been publicly disclosed. But the process 
potentially undermines allocative efficiency (Meeks and Meeks, 2014): had acquirer 
managers not flattered their earnings record through accrual manipulation prior to the 
share bid, they may not necessarily have secured investors’ support for the deal and 
been awarded control of the target. 
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Value of M&A deals by UK companies.
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Figure 1b
Number of M&A deals by UK companies.














































































































































































































































































p-value    
for the 
difference
Turnover (£m) 851.12 1,483.21 0.0907 1,298.75 2,083.14 0.2629
Net Income (£m) 76.30 95.78 0.3313 44.46 286.32 0.0418
CFO (£m) 112.52 120.01 0.4428 108.69 302.93 0.1014
Assets (£m) 947.48 1,247.92 0.2357 1,345.59 3,073.61 0.1236
MV (£m) 1,434.07 1,258.36 0.3444 1,408.95 2,013.30 0.2768
ROA (%) 7.00 10.56 0.0488 3.65 8.73 0.0012
Sales Growth (%) 23.55 20.55 0.3120 18.94 11.78 0.2147
PTB ratio 4.99 3.82 0.2095 3.33 3.84 0.2662
Overvaluation (%) 29.01 21.49 0.0536 28.10 29.84 0.4392
Deal Value (£m) 620.24 258.30 0.0066 341.24 195.82 0.1541
Premium (%) 26.68 33.10 0.1837 39.76 42.43 0.4550
Days to announcement 158.89 163.31 0.3995 182.11 134.86 0.0327
Days to completion 78.29 50.37 0.0009 79.50 58.93 0.1091
Domestic deals 64 39 15 18
Public Targets 65 23 19 5
Industry-related deals 68 55 24 34
Hostile deals 4 1 1 0
Contested deals 6 1 0 0
Descriptive statistics.
High M&A Activity Phase (N=155) Low M&A Activity Phase (N=71)
The reported figures represent the mean values for the corresponding variables. All accounting variables are
computed as at the end of the financial year immediately preceding the announcement of a deal. Tests for
the differences are based on t-tests and significant results are marked in bold. Turnover, Net Income, CFO,
Total Assets and Market Value are the acquirers' net sales (WC01001), net income before extraordinary
items (WC01551), cash flow from operations (WC04860), total assets (WC02999) and market capitalization
(MV) respectively. Return on Assets (ROA) is computed as Earnings Before Interest and Tax (WC18191)
over the average of opening and closing Total Assets (WC02999). Sales Growth is the percentage change in
net sales (WC01001). PTB is the Price-to-Book ratio, defined as the market value (MV) of common equity
of the acquirer over the book value of common equity (WC03501). Overvaluation is measured relatively to
each sample firm i's industry j Price-to-Book ratio, i.e. (PTBit-PTBjt)/PTBit. Deal value is the total
consideration paid for the target company. Premium is the percentage premium paid by the acquirer with
respect to the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement (it applies to public targets
only). Days to announcement measures the time lapse between the most recent annual report release date
and the deal-announcement date. Days to completion measures the time lapse between the announcement
date and the completion date of a deal (i.e. the date when the deal is declared unconditional). A domestic
deal is one where the target (whether publicly traded or privately owned) is based in the UK. An industry-
related deal is one where the acquirer and the target belong to the same two-digit SIC code. A hostile deal is
one where the target company opposes the acquirer’s approach. A contested deal is one where a rival bidder
is involved in the process of the negotiations.
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Year [-1] Year [0] Year [+1] Year [+2] Year [+3]
High M&A activity phase:
       Share acquirers 0.0112       0.0299***      0.0342* -0.0022 -0.0024
(0.2370)       (0.0026) (0.0828) (0.4485) (0.4325)
       Cash acquirers -0.0029      -0.0020     -0.0062 -0.0138 0.0127
(0.4064)       (0.4196) (0.3331) (0.1600) (0.1838)
       Non-acquirers 0.0040 0.0053 -0.0026 -0.0072 0.0025
(0.4043)       (0.3243) (0.4364) (0.3450) (0.4485)
       Share vs. cash acquirers 0.0141       0.0319**      0.0404* 0.0116 -0.0151
(0.2384)       (0.0138) (0.0781) (0.2948) (0.2252)
       Share vs. non-acquirers 0.0072       0.0246**      0.0368* 0.0050 -0.0049
(0.3742)       (0.0280) (0.0817) (0.4184) (0.4183)
Low M&A activity phase:
       Share acquirers    -0.0161 0.0221 -0.0088 -0.0137 0.0033
(0.1148) (0.1635) (0.4051) (0.2524) (0.4442)
       Cash acquirers    -0.0085       -0.0127 -0.0082 -0.0028 0.0009
(0.1641) (0.1743) (0.3080) (0.3943) (0.4631)
       Non-acquirers 0.0028 -0.0130 -0.0173 -0.0310 0.0243
(0.5841) (0.2747) (0.2759) (0.1725) (0.2031)
       Share vs. cash acquirers -0.0076        0.0348* -0.0006 -0.0109 0.0024
(0.2379) (0.0926) (0.4948) (0.3173) (0.4631)
       Share vs. non-acquirers -0.0189        0.0351* 0.0085 0.0173 -0.0210
(0.1356)       (0.0638) (0.4266) (0.2039) (0.2863)
Table 2     
Acquirers' discretionary accruals in the five years surrounding the deal announcement: by M&A activity phase.
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Based on a sample of 113 UK publicly traded companies undertaking share swap acquisitions during the period
1997-2010 (and on their control group of cash acquirers), the table reports discretionary working capital accruals
estimated from the ROA-adjusted modified-Jones model. Year [0] (Year [-1]) is the first (second) year with an
earnings release preceding the announcement of the deal. Years [+1], [+2] and [+3] are the first, second and third
year respectively following the deal completion. Significant results are marked in bold and the corresponding p-
values are given in parenthesis; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.
The table reports discretionary working capital accru ls estimated from the ROA-adjusted modified-Jones model
for the sample of 113 UK publicly traded omp nies undertaking share-swap a qu sitions du ing the period 1997-
2010; and f r their control groups of cash acquirers and matched non-acquirers. Year [0] Year [-1]) is the first
(seco d) year with an earnings release preceding the announcement of the deal. Years [+1], [+2] and [+3] are the
first, second and third year respectively fo lowing the deal completion. Significant results are marked in bold and
the corresponding p-values are given in parenthesis; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate 1%, 5% and 10% lev l of significance
respectively.
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Share acquirers 41 12 53
Cash acquirers 26 17 43
Total 67 29 96











EM_RANK         2.1213*** 0.9407 1.3202
(0.0040) (0.1680) (0.1620)
DOMESTIC         1.3321*         1.4973* 0.6656
(0.0780) (0.0650) (0.5170)
PREMIUM         4.6390***         2.4868**         6.2755***
(0.0020) (0.0340) (0.0000)
REL_SIZE         2.7148** 1.7287         2.4995**
(0.0260) (0.2030) (0.0460)
IND_REL 0.2504 0.0097 -0.1730
(0.8470) (0.9940) (0.9010)
BETA 0.4291 0.5811 0.1483
(0.3210) (0.1850) (0.7460)
Table 3
Acquirers' pre-bid earnings management and subsequent goodwill impairments.
     Pr(GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_HIGH/GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_LOW/GW_IMPAIR_CASH_HIGH) 3,1,  tti  
 = 0 + itRANKEM _1 + itDOMESTIC2 + itPREMIUM3 + itSIZEREL _4 + itRELIND _5     
   + itBETA6 + itMOMENTUM7 + itSIZE8 + itPTB9 + itGROWTHSALES _10 + it              
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MOMENTUM         2.0185** 0.9345 1.1993
(0.0250) (0.3120) (0.2050)
SIZE -0.2629 -0.0125        -0.6585**
(0.1550) (0.9450) (0.0390)
PTB 0.0015 -0.0089 0.0147
(0.9690) (0.8460) (0.7000)
SALES_GROWTH 0.5908 1.4071 0.3613
(0.6150) (0.2250) (0.7560)
Intercept -1.6832 -1.9839 0.0212
(0.2430) (0.1990) (0.9910)
Pseudo R-sq. 0.2365
The table analyzes goodwill impairments recorded within three years following completion of the
deal for a sub-sample of 99 UK publicly traded companies undertaking share-swap acquisitions
during the period 1997-2010 (and for their control group of cash acquirers). Regression variables
in Panel B are defined as follows: (GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_HIGH/
GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_LOW/GW_IMPAIR_CASH_HIGH)i,t+1,t+3 is a polychotomous variable
coded 1 for goodwill impairments following share-swap acquisitions announced during high M&A
activity phases (GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_HIGH), coded 2 for goodwill impairments following share-
swap acquisitions announced during low M&A activity phases (GW_IMPAIR_SHARE_LOW),
coded 3 for goodwill impairments following cash acquisitions announced during high M&A
activity phases (GW_IMPAIR_CASH_HIGH), and 0 otherwise; EM_RANK is a dummy variable
set equal to 1 if acquirer i is ranked into an aggressive earnings management quartile based on the
level of its pre-bid discretionary working capital accruals at t, and zero otherwise; DOMESTIC is a
dummy variable set equal to one if the target firm is based in the UK and zero otherwise;
PREMIUM is the percentage premium paid by the acquirer with respect to the target’s share price
four weeks before the bid announcement (it applies to public targets only); REL_SIZE reflects the
relative size of the target firm and is measured as the ratio of the total consideration paid for the
target over the acquirer’s market value; IND_REL is a dummy variable reflecting the industry
relatedness of target and bidding firm, set equal to one if the acquirer and the target belong to the
same two-digit SIC code and zero otherwise; BETA is the firm’s beta (a proxy for risk), estimated
by regressing for a period of up to 60 months each sample firm’s returns on market (FT-All Share
Index) returns; MOMENTUM is the firm’s cumulative return in the previous 12-month period;
SIZE is the natural log of total assets; PTB is the Price-to-Book ratio (a proxy for overvaluation);
SALES_GROWTH is the percentage change in sales revenue. Significant results are marked in bold
and the corresponding p-values are given in parenthesis; the reported p-values reflect White-
adjusted standard errors; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.
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Difference    
High vs. Low
Share acquirers      0.0073      0.0161**    -0.0335***      0.0496**
(p  > 0.10) (p  < 0.05) (p  < 0.01) (p  =  0.0139)
Cash acquirers      0.0210***      0.0132***     0.0384***     -0.0252*
(p  < 0.01) (p  < 0.01) (p  < 0.01) (p  =  0.0509)







Difference    
High vs. Low
     Conservative EM quartiles      0.0095      0.0097      0.0084      0.0013
(p  > 0.10) (p  > 0.10) (p  > 0.10) (p  =  0.4772)
     Aggressive EM quartiles      0.0057      0.0207***     -0.0753***      0.0960***
(p  > 0.10) (p  < 0.01) (p  < 0.01) (p  =  0.0043)
Table 4
Acquirers' abnormal stock returns at earnings announcement.
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Based on a sample of 113 UK publicly traded companies undertaking share-swap acquisitions during the
period 1997-2010 (and on their control group of cash acquirers), the table reports Cumulative Average
Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the three-day event window (trading days -1 to +1) surrounding the
acquirers' earnings-announcement date (day 0). The latter was obtained from the Regulatory News
Service of the London Stock Exchange. Returns of sample firms are benchmarked against ten size-based
control portfolios. Earnings management (EM) in the year immediately preceding the announcement of a
deal is proxied by discretionary working capital accruals estimated from the ROA-adjusted modified-
Jones model. Conservative (aggressive) EM quartiles are those where abnormal accruals are below
(above) the sample median. Tests for the significance of the CARs are based on the t-statistic in Brown
and Warner (1985). Significant results are marked in bold and the corresponding p-values are given in















EDWCA -0.0802 -0.0860 0.0517 0.0758
(0.6030) (0.5920) (0.2720) (0.1990)
EDWCA x PAYMENT       0.2962**       0.3102**      -0.8376**      -0.6434**
(0.0160) (0.0130) (0.0200) (0.0220)
BEAT 0.0264* 0.0376
(0.0720) (0.2600)
EARN_SURP       0.5535*** -0.8693
(0.0070) (0.5250)
PROFIT -0.0092 -0.0011 0.0147 0.0156
(0.6450) (0.9560) (0.8120) (0.7880)
PROFIT_INCR 0.0277 0.0271 -0.0320 -0.0263
(0.1810) (0.1980) (0.2650) (0.3890)
BEAT × EDWCA       0.2376*      -0.7775***
(0.0560) (0.0100)
EARN_SURP × EDWCA       0.2641**      -0.8084***
(0.0280) (0.0060)
PROFIT × EDWCA -0.3478 -0.4118 0.1485 0.1693
(0.1310) (0.1030) (0.6070) (0.5130)
PROFIT_INCR × EDWCA 0.0479 0.0842 0.1622 -0.2182
(0.8290) (0.7060) (0.5100) (0.2100)
Table 5
Acquirers' abnormal stock returns at earnings announcement: regression analysis.
CAR it  =   0 + itEDWCA1 + itEDWCA2 x itPAYMENT + itBEAT3 + itPROFIT4 + itINCRPROFIT _5      
           + itBEAT6  x itEDWCA  + itPROFIT7  x itEDWCA  + itINCPROFIT _8  x itEDWCA                   
           +  itBETA9  + itMOMENTUM10  + itSIZE11  + itPTB12  + itGROWTHSALES _13 + it          (a)  
                                                                                                                                                                      
CAR it  = 0 + itEDWCA1 + itEDWCA2 x itPAYMENT + itSURPEARN _3 + itPROFIT4 + itINCRPROFIT _5   
           + itSURPEARN _6  x itEDWCA  + itPROFIT7  x itEDWCA  + itINCRPROFIT _8  x itEDWCA                
           +  itBETA9  + itMOMENTUM10  + itSIZE11  + itPTB12  + itGROWTHSALES _13 + it            (b)         
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BETA -0.0108 -0.0113 -0.0231 -0.0086
(0.1120) (0.1000) (0.3020) (0.6650)
MOMENTUM -0.0345*    -0.0452** -0.0744 -0.0295
(0.0840) (0.0260) (0.1610) (0.6250)
SIZE 0.0017 0.0022 -0.0046 -0.0049
(0.6540) (0.5730) (0.4260) (0.4120)
PTB       -0.0012**       -0.0011** 0.0036 0.0040
(0.0130) (0.0280) (0.7260) (0.6040)
SALES_GROWTH        0.0415*        0.0431* -0.0134 -0.0111
(0.0880) (0.0710) (0.4770) (0.5250)
Intercept -0.0050 0.0020 0.0462 0.0334
(0.8740) (0.9510) (0.5470) (0.6420)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0655 0.0853 0.1930 0.2455
Based on a sample of 113 UK publicly traded companies undertaking share-swap acquisitions during the
period 1997-2010 (and on their control group of cash acquirers), the table reports the results from
estimating pooled OLS regressions using the following variables: CAR is the three-day size-adjusted
abnormal return for acquirer i, cumulated from one trading day before to one trading day after the earnings-
announcement date; EDWCA are the estimated discretionary working capital accruals (derived from the
ROA-adjusted modified-Jones model); PAYMENT is a dummy variable set equal to one in the case of share
acquirers and zero in the case of cash acquirers; BEAT is a dummy variable set equal to one if the actual
EPS figure of acquirer i at t exceeds the consensus most recent analyst forecast provided prior to the
earnings-announcement date by Thomson I/B/E/S database, and zero otherwise; EARN_SURP is the
difference between the actual EPS figure of acquirer i at t and the consensus most recent analyst forecast,
scaled by the beginning-of-year share price; PROFIT is a dummy variable set equal to one if acquirer i
reports positive earnings at t, and zero otherwise; PROFIT_INCR is a dummy variable set equal to one if
acquirer i reports an earnings improvement at t over the previous year, and zero otherwise; BETA is the
firm’s beta (a proxy for risk), estimated by regressing for a period of up to 60 months each sample firm’s
returns on market (FT-All Share Index) returns; MOMENTUM is the firm’s cumulative return in the
previous 12-month period; SIZE is the natural log of total assets; PTB is the Price-to-Book ratio (a proxy
for overvaluation); SALES_GROWTH is the percentage change in sales revenue. Significant results are
marked in bold and the corresponding p-values are given in parenthesis; the reported p-values reflect
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by both year and industry; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.
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Difference    
High vs. Low
Share acquirers      -0.0103**      0.0022      -0.0485***       0.0507**
(p  < 0.05) (p  > 0.10) (p  < 0.01) (p  =  0.0255)
Cash acquirers      0.0267***      0.0248***       0.0298*** 0.0050
(p  < 0.01) (p  < 0.01) (p  < 0.01) (p  =  0.3478)







Difference    
High vs. Low
     Conservative EM quartiles -0.0057 0.0070      -0.0320** 0.0390
(p  > 0.10) (p  > 0.10) (p  < 0.05) (p  =  0.1073)
     Aggressive EM quartiles      -0.0138** -0.0008      -0.0705***       0.0697**
(p  < 0.05) (p  > 0.10) (p  < 0.01) (p  =  0.0429)
Table 6
Acquirers' abnormal stock returns at bid announcement.
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Based on a sample of 113 UK publicly traded companies undertaking share-swap acquisitions during the
period 1997-2010 (and on their control group of cash acquirers), the table reports Cumulative Average
Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the three-day event window (trading days -1 to +1) surrounding the bid-
announcement date (day 0). The Market Model has been applied to derive the expected returns for each
acquirer. Earnings management (EM) in the year immediately preceding the announcement of a deal is
proxied by discretionary working capital accruals estimated from the ROA-adjusted modified-Jones model.
Conservative (aggressive) EM quartiles are those where abnormal accruals are below (above) the sample
median. Tests for the significance of the CARs are based on the t-statistic in Brown and Warner (1985).
Significant results are marked in bold and the corresponding p-values are given in parenthesis; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗















REL_SIZE -0.0077      -0.0893**
(0.5380) (0.0170)












Intercept       0.0936*       0.1535***
(0.0770) (0.0000)
Table 7
Acquirers' abnormal stock returns at bid announcement: regression analysis.
CAR it  =   0  + 1EDWCAit + itPAYMENT2   + itDOMESTIC3  + itPREMIUM4  
     + itSIZEREL _5  + itRELIND _6  + itBETA7  + itMOMENTUM8   
     + itSIZE9  + itPTB10   + itGROWTHSALES _11  + it                                           
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0892 0.4260
Based on a sample of 113 UK publicly traded companies undertaking share-swap
acquisitions during the period 1997-2010 (and on their control group of cash
acquirers), the table reports the results from estimating a pooled OLS regression
using the following variables: CAR is the three-day abnormal return (obtained using
the Market Model) for acquirer i, cumulated from one trading day before to one
trading day after the bid-announcement date; EDWCA are the estimated
discretionary working capital accruals (derived from the ROA-adjusted modified-
Jones model); PAYMENT is a dummy variable set equal to one in the case of share
acquirers and zero in the case of cash acquirers; DOMESTIC is a dummy variable set
equal to one if the target firm is based in the UK and zero otherwise; PREMIUM is
the percentage premium paid by the acquirer with respect to the target’s share price
four weeks before the bid announcement (it applies to public targets only);
REL_SIZE reflects the relative size of the target firm and is measured as the ratio of
the total consideration paid for the target over the acquirer’s market value; IND_REL
is a dummy variable reflecting the industry relatedness of target and bidding firm, set
equal to one if the acquirer and the target belong to the same two-digit SIC code and
zero otherwise; BETA is the firm’s beta (a proxy for risk), estimated by regressing
for a period of up to 60 months each sample firm’s returns on market (FT-All Share
Index) returns; MOMENTUM is the firm’s cumulative return in the previous 12-
month period; SIZE is the natural log of total assets; PTB is the Price-to-Book ratio
(a proxy for overvaluation); SALES_GROWTH is the percentage change in sales
revenue.
Significant results are marked in bold and the corresponding p-values are given in
parenthesis; the reported p-values reflect standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-
robust and clustered by both year and industry; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate 1%, 5% and
10% level of significance respectively.
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